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INTRODUCTION

For the past decade, identity theft has been the leading form of consumer complaint to the Federal
Trade Commission and a leading source of problems for the IRS. The term "identity theft"
encompasses a wide range of activities where an individual's or a business' identifying information
is misused for the benefit of the thief. Based on the most recent FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK, published in March of 2017, employment and taxrelated fraud were the most common form of identity theft, accounting for 34% of all reported
cases. In 2016, tax-related identity theft comprised approximately 20% of the Taxpayer Advocate
Service's case receipts. 2
The National Taxpayer Advocate first tagged identity theft as a most serious problem in her 2004
annual report to Congress. The financial consequences of tax-related identity theft may include
frozen or delayed refunds, loss of tax benefits, assessment of additional taxes, imposition of liens
and levies to collect the incorrectly assessed taxes, and issues with non-tax benefits tied to
income (such as housing or food stamps) due to attribution of additional income. Persons facing
identity theft will experience a long path to clearing their identity and will face significant
obstacles in gaining information about the theft. A Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration ("TIGTA") analysis of tax returns filed during the 2014 filing season revealed
that the Service potentially paid out around $1.6 billion in fraudulent refunds attributable to
undetected identity theft. 3 The initial attempts by the IRS to address identity theft were clumsy
1

This outline draws heavily from Chapter 22, "Resolving Identity Theft in Tax Administration," of Effectively
Representing Your Client Before the IRS, a publication of the ABA Tax Section. Keith Fogg is the editor of this
book, and both Judge Leyden and Craig Bell have authored chapters in this book. The 71h edition of the book is
forthcoming later this year. Special thanks to the authors of the chapter on identity theft since it first entered the
book in 2011: Anna Barsegyan, Ariel Stephenson, Rachael Rubenstein, Paul Downey, Robert Wunderle, Vijay
Raghavan and Susan Morgenstern.
2 IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Vol. 1, 522, available at
http://www. taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/media/default/documents/2-16-arc/arc 16_vo1ume1. pdf.
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TIGTA, 2017-40-017, EFFORTS CONTINUE TO RESULT IN IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION OF FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS
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and uncoordinated; however, the news is not all bad. In recent years, the IRS has made
significant strides to address this issue and to combat this type of fraud.
A May 2012 report released by TIGTA reported that the IRS provided ineffective and untimely
assistance to victims of identity theft. 4 A follow-up audit, completed in 2015, revealed case
resolution time still averaged 278 days. 5 A January 2017 report released by the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") determined that the IRS had reduced the time an identity theft
case was open, to an average of 106 days in 2016. 6 A June 2017 report released by TIGTA found
case closure time frames for identity theft refund cases had decreased to an average of 166 days_?
The following chart illustrates the scope of the problem from 2010 through 2013.

Identity Theft Incidents and Taxpayers Affected During CY 2010 Through CY 2013 8

Calendar
Year

IRS-Identified
Incidents Taxpayers

Taxpayer-Initiated
Incidents Taxpayers

Total
Incidents Taxpayers

2010

338,753

201,376

101,828

69,142

440,581

270,518

2011

1,014,884

553,730

110,750

87,322

1,125,634

641,052

2012

1,508,375

985,843

277,491

233,365

1,785,866

1,219,208

2013

2,542,488

2,106,932

376,996

309,841

2,919,484

2,416,773

The volume of identity-theft incidents in IRS inventory peaked in calendar year 2013. 9 It has
dropped in each of the subsequent years. In 2016, the IRS statistics through September showed
that it "stopped 787,000 confmned identity theft returns, totaling more than $4 billion",
compared to 1.2 million returns worth approximately $7.2 billion for the same time period in
2015. 10

INVOLVING IDENTITY THEFT; HOWEVER, ACCURACY OF MEASURES NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 7 (Feb. 7, 2017).
4

See TIGTA, 2012-40-050, MOST TAXPAYERS WHOSE IDENTITIES HAVE BEEN STOLEN TO COMMIT REFUND FRAUD
DO NOT RECEIVE QUALITY CUSTOMER SERVICE 5, 8, 12-13 (May 3, 2012).
5

TIGTA, 2015-40-024, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE DELAYS AND ERRORS IN RECEIVING
REFUNDS 5 (Mar. 20, 2015).

6

See GAO, 17-186, IRS IMPROVED TELEPHONE SERVICE BUT NEEDS TO BETTER ASSIST IDENTITY THEFT VICTIMS
AND PREVENT RELEASE OF FRAUDULENT REFUNDS 23 (Jan. 31, 20 17).

7

TIGTA, 2017-40-036, CENTRALIZATION OF IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM ASSISTANCE REDUCED CASE CLOSURE TIME
FRAMESANDTAXACCOUNTERRORS 5 (June 6, 2017).
8

TIGTA, 2015-40-024, supra note 5, at 2.

9

Id. at 3.

10

IRS, SECURITY SUMMIT PARTNERS EXPAND IDENTITY THEFT SAFEGUARDS FOR 2017 FILING SEASON, BUILD ON
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What has IRS done to combat identity-theft?
1)
2)
3)
4)

Increased criminal prosecutions
Improved detection models
Partnered with private and state actors to obtain better information11
Obtained legislation pushing back time for payment of refund in EITC returns 12, moving
up the due dates for payers' submission ofW-2, W-3, and 1099-MISC forms to January
31st (effective in 2017) 13 and providing access prisoner database 14
5) Promulgated regulations permitting the use of Truncated Taxpayer Identification
Numbers (TTINs), where not prohibited by the Code, applicable regulations, or other
official IRS guidance. 15
In 2015, the IRS hosted the first security summit in an effort to bring together a broad coalition
of players involved in defeating identity theft. 16 While the IRS had made significant progress,
the problem remains a serious problem and identity thieves have not given up. The recent
Equifax data breach exposing significant information about almost all American adults raises
concerns for identity-theft efforts in the future. 17 To the extent that the IRS has made significant
strides to resolve the issues caused by identity-theft over the past several years, it has done so by
devoting resources to this issue at a time of significant strain on its overall resources due to
dwindling budgets. It is difficult to measure the true cost of identity-theft because it has diverted
20 16 SUCCESSES, https ://www .irs. gov/uac/newsroom/irs-security-summit-partners-expand-identity-theft-safeguardsfor-2017-filing -season-build-on-20 16-successes (last updated Nov. 3, 20 16).
11

See, e.g., IRS, INDUSTRY, STATES TAKE NEW STEPS TOGETHER TO FIGHT IDENTITY THEFT, PROTECT TAXPAYERS,
June 11, 2015, available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-and-industry-and-states-take-new-steps-togetherto-fight-identity-theft-and-protect-taxpayers.
12

Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of2015 ("PATH Act"), Pub. L. No. 114-113, Division Q, § 201(b)

13

Id. at § 201.

14

See, i.e., Keith Fogg, "Prisoners Filing Fraudulent Returns and the Efforts to Detect It," September 21, 2017,
procedurallytaxing.com, http://procedurallytaxing.com/prisoners-filing-fraudulent-returns-and-the-efforts-to-detectit/
15

16

Reg. § 301.6109-4(b).

2015 Security Summit: Protecting Taxpayers from Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud, 3, available at

https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/20 15 %20Security%20Summit%20Report.pdf.
17

Tim Maurer, The Big Takeaway from the Equifax Hack? Only You Can Protect Your Identity, Forbes (Sept. 12,
2017,11:00 a.m.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timmaurer/2017/09/12/the-big-takeaway-from-theequifax-hack-only-you-can-protect-your-identity/#7325626b3ec7; Mauri Backman, Will the Equifax
data breach impact your Social Security benefits?, USA Today (Sept. 15, 2017,9:48 a.m.),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2017/09/15/will-the-equifax-databreach-impact-your-social-security-benefits/105616332/; Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What
To Do, Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-databreach-what-do.
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significant IRS resources from examination and collection to prevention and unwinding of the
problems caused by the fraudulent activity.

Tax Related Identity Theft
Three main types of theft exist:
1) Employment related- this type of identity theft occurs when individuals need
identification in order to obtain employment. Usually, the individuals engaging in
employment related theft seek to do so because they are undocumented. Using the social
security number of someone else allows these individuals to work as employees. (While
an undocumented person can file a tax return with an ITIN, the ITIN does not permit the
person to work as an employee.) This type of theft does not generally seek to harm the
true owner of the social security number ("SSN") but has the collateral effect of doing so.
When the employer sends to the IRS the Form W-2 or Form 1099 information regarding
the identity thief employee, the information ends up on the account of the true owner of
the SSN and gets picked up by the IRS when it runs the Automated Underreporter (AUR)
program. The true owner of the SSN then receives correspondence from the IRS asking
about the failure to report the income and begins a lengthy joumey with the IRS to
resolve the correct reporting of this income.
This type of theft also has consequences for the thief if the thief later seeks to become
documented and enter the path to citizenship or permanent residence. In order to obtain
legal status in the United States, the thief needs to show compliance with the tax laws.
This can result in an arduous effort to unwind the use of stolen identification in order to
properly report the income.
The issue has consequences beyond the IRS. Almost always this activity implicates
Social Security records of eamings and other agencies as well. The victim, if a recipient
of government benefits, can have those government benefits removed because of the
reports issued to the IRS and the SSA showing additional income. The victim must go
through a similar effort with the agencies providing the benefits to unwind the improper
reporting of this income similar to the effort it must expend with the IRS.
Victims who are low income are particularly vulnerable because they do not have
resources and skills to address the problems raised by the additional income appearing on
their records. Commonly, these individuals will fail to respond to the IRS or other
agencies in a timely manner when notices are issued and as a result end up with a tax
assessment which results in an offset of refunds, a notice of federal tax lien and other
collection action or lose benefits critical to their well-being. 18

18

Les Book, "TIGTA Report Shows-IRS Has a Long Way to Go on Employment Related Identity Theft," July 17,
2017, http://procedurall ytaxing.com/tigta-report-shows-irs-has-a-long-way-to-go-on -employment-related-identitytheft/.
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2) Refund related- this type of identity-theft seeks to use the victim's identity in order for
the thief to obtain a refund to which they are not entitled. 19 This is the type of theft that
breaches like the one at Equifax make much easier, though the data obtained in that
breach could also be used for employment related identity-theft. Here the thief will use
the taxpayer's identity to file a tax return claiming deductions or credits that result in a
refund and steal money from the government. This type of theft frequently seeks to
obtain refundable credits because those types of refunds do not require withholding
credits on account with the IRS.
The thief typically files early in the filing season in order to be the first return filed with
that SSN. Later, when the true taxpayer files, the IRS will reject the return of the true
taxpayer because it already has on file the return of the thief. The true taxpayer will take
months unwinding the fraudulent transaction in order to get the IRS to accept the correct
return. This will significantly delay the receipt of any refund by the true taxpayer as well
as cause the true taxpayer, and the IRS, much effort to fix the problem.
In the case of low income taxpayers, the return filed by the thief may be the only return
filed because the true taxpayer does not have a filing requirement. In these
circumstances, the detection of the fraud becomes more difficult for the IRS and for the
victim. The victim may not know of the fraud until contacted by a third party notifying
the true taxpayer of the loss of benefits as a result of the additional income. 20 In the case
of an elderly taxpayer who may reside in a nursing home, the unwinding of the theft may
fall upon family members seeking to assist the relative but unequipped to easily do so.
While the primary problem created by refund-related identity theft is a direct loss of
funds by the government to the thief, the collateral consequences to the true owner of the
identity can mirror the problems created for the victim of employment-related identity
theft.
3) Business related- this type of identity theft occurs when someone creates, uses or
attempts to use a business's identifying information without authorization to obtain tax
benefits. 21 This type of theft involves both active and closed business. 22 The thief
generally seeks to use the business identity in order to receive refundable business credits
or to perpetuate individual identity theft. 23 Victims are often unaware that their identities
19

I.R.M. 25.23.1.4.1. In order toe-file a fraudulent tax return and receive a refund based upon falsified income and
withholding information, the thief only needs a victim's name, SSN (or other tax identification number), and date of
birth.
20 The decision of the IRS to suspend its program of preparing substitute for returns for taxpayers who do not file
may cause a delay in the true taxpayer learning about the theft of their identification.
See
http://procedurallytaxing.com/automated-substitute-for-return-asfr-program-suspended/
and
http://procedurallytaxing.com/follow-up-to-yesterdays-post-on-suspension-of-asfr-program/
21
I.R.M. 25.23.4.1.
22

I.R.M 25.23.9.1.

23 This type of theft does not typically involve undocumented workers because they can operate a business with an
ITIN. So, the typical person engaging in business Identity theft does so specifically for the purpose of stealing from
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have been compromised until they receive a notice or bill from the Service. Businessrelated identity theft tends to be more complex and cross-functional in nature than
individual identity theft. As with the theft of an individual's identity, this theft can create
significant adverse consequences for the targeted business. The business could suffer
damage to its reputation, direct financial loss, high cost of professional representation to
rectify the situation and lost business opportunity for the time and effort needed to
resolve the problem. 24
As the IRS has improved its pe1formance regarding refund identity theft, more thieves
have turned to business related identity theft in order to stay ahead of the curve.

IRS Structure for Addressing Identity Theft
When the problem first attracted widespread attention ten years ago, the IRS created the Pdvacy,
Information Protection, and Data Secudty Office, which, it renamed the Privacy, Government
Liaison, and Disclosure ("PGLD") Office in 2011. 25 The IRS created this office to oversee the use
of Personally Identifiable Information ("PIT") and to find ways to maintain the security of this
infmmation. 26 Inside of PGLD, the IRS established the Office of Incident Management 27 and the
Office of Privacy Policy and Knowledge Management. 28
In 2015, in an effort to provide consistent treatment to victims of tax-related identity theft, 29 the
Service created the Identity Theft Victim Assistance ("lTVA") Headquarters, a new headquarters
operation affiliated with the Identity Protection Strategy and Oversight Program ("IPS0"). 30
IPSO seeks to help taxpayers by providing victim assistance, outreach, and prevention of future
identity theft. The IPSO Program has fifteen distinct responsibilities, including: responsibility for
developing, defining, monitoring, and executing identity theft policies and procedures; reducing
taxpayer burden and improving service options while addressing and resolving identity theft
cases; and protecting revenue through increased vigilance at the point of return submission. 31
IPSO now fmmulates the guidelines that the IRS uses to handle identity theft cases.

the taxpayer.
See recent IRS release on "Information on Identity Theft for Business, Partnerships and Estate and Trusts" at
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/information-on-identity-theft-for-business-partnerships-and-estate-and-trusts;
See
also www.irs.gov/protectyourclients.
24

25

TIGTA, 2012-40-050, supra note 4, at 3.

26

See I.R.M. 10.5.1.2(3).

27

I.R.M. 10.5.1.7 .12.

28

I.R.M. 10.5.1.7.1.

29
Tax-Related Identity Theft: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 114th Cong. (Aug. 26, 2015) (Written
Testimony of The Honorable J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration).
30

I.R.M. 25.23.1.3(4).

31

I.R.M. 25.23.1.3.1(2).
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The IRS has created a Technical Working Group to identify ways to assist victims, an Identity
Theft Advisory Council ("IDTAC") through which it shares ideas on how to attack the problem of
identity theft with other interested parties and an Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee
("IDTESC") to provide oversight. Because of the scrutiny of this issue by Congress and the need for
coordination with numerous other agencies, the IRS devotes much energy to this problem.

Identity Protection Specialized Unit
The Identity Protection Specialized Unit ("IPSU") was established in 2008 in Wage & Investment,
Accounts Management, to provide individualized assistance to taxpayers who are, or may become,
victims of identity theft. 32 IPSU was generally seen as a failure in its early years and has never
lived up to the purpose for which it was originally intended which was to provide individualized
assistance to victims by assigning a specific IRS employee to assist that person in resolving the
problem. In 2015, IPSU was consolidated into the Identity Theft Victim Assistance ("IDTVA")
Directorate. 33 IPSU quickly evolved into a place that did not resolve problems but rather monitors
identity theft cases worked by other IRS functions. Practitioners generally found IPSU difficult to
work with. The IRS thought that having a central point of contact for a taxpayer trying to work
through an identity theft problem would be the most helpful and it might have been if that point of
contact had the authority to and did actually work to fix the problem. In its role as a coordinator,
IPSU never fulfilled the initial vision.
Taxpayers may report identity theft affecting their tax accounts directly to IPSU by calling the
identity theft hotline at (800) 908-4490. This number will connect taxpayers directly to an IPSU
customer service representative who can provide general information and answer basic questions.
Taxpayers may also self-report identity theft to IPSU before it has impacted their tax accounts. 34
IPSU will then serve as an intake, referral, and liaison unit for other Service functions that
ultimately work the case and make account adjustments. 35
Accounts Management

The vast majority of identity theft cases get worked by the Accounts Management function, Six
specialized groups within Accounts Management work identity theft cases. 36 Starting in 2013 the
IRS tried to get a jump start on fixing the problem created by refund identity theft. It created Form
14039 Identity Theft Affidavit ("ITA"). This form seeks to treat signal to the IRS that it should treat
the return filed by the true taxpayer as the real return and not as a duplicate filing as previously
done. If the taxpayer attaches this affidavit to the return, Accounts Management should mark the

32

TIGTA,

2016-40-003, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE IDENTITY PROTECTION SPECIALIZED UNIT TO BETTER
1, 8-11 (Oct. 27, 2015).

ASSIST VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT
33

I.R.M. 25.23.1.3(5). ·

34

Id. at 1.

35

See id.; see also I.R.M. 8.6.5.1.1(10).

36

Id.
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return with a specialized code and send it to one of the specialized groups within Accounts
Management for immediate processing. 37 Adopting this procedure has significantly reduced the
time it takes to fix the problem for the true taxpayer. 38
Criminal Investigation

The IRS created the Identity Theft Clearinghouse ("ITC") in 2012 within CI. 39 As of March 2016,
the Cleadnghouse had received over 10,750 identity theft leads since its inception. 40 The IRS
increased the number of offenses it authodzed special agents to investigate in relation to identity
theft. The matters that special agents can now investigation in connection with identity theft
include: forging endorsements on Treasury checks, theft of public money, fraud in connection with
access devices, mail fraud, and wire fraud. Cijoined with the Department of Justice Tax Division
to make these investigations a much higher priority and issued DOJ-Tax Directive 144, which
delegates authority to the United States Attorney's Offices to authorize tax-related grand jury
investigations, to file federal criminal complaints, and to apply for seizure wanants. 41 If an
investigation covered by this directive goes forward, the U.S. Attorney must notify CI if it proceeds
with a grand jury investigation so that the prosecution may take advantage of access to tax returns
and return information under section 6103(h). Because of the limited resources in CI, making
identity theft a high priority on its investigation list has led to a number of high profile criminal
investigations in the past few years in this area where previously almost none existed.
CI has developed the Identity Theft Victim Disclosure Waiver Process in an effort to aid state and
local law enforcement agencies pursuing identity theft investigations. 42 Generally, section 6103
forbids the disclosure of tax returns and return information to third parties including state and local
law enforcement. The Waiver Process allows victims of identity theft to authorize the release of
tax information to the designated state or local law enforcement official conducting the
investigation. Disclosure issues pervade the area of identity theft and this is just one example of
how the IRS and victims might work around the disclosure issues presented by identity theft. This
workaround does expose information about the victims and that can be a concern. More discussion
37

38

See id. at 6.
TIGTA, 2015-40-024, supra note 5.

39
Examining the Skyrocketing Problem of Identity Theft Related Tax Fraud at the IRS: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Gov't Operations of the H Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 113th Cong. 15-17 (Aug. 2, 2013) (Written
Testimony of Daniel Welfel, Principal Deputy Commissioner, IRS).
40

IRS, IRS'S TOP 10 IDENTITY THEFT PROSECUTIONS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CONTINUES EFFORTS TO HALT
REFUND FRAUD, Mar. 21, 2016, available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irss-top-10-identity-theftprosecutions-criminal-investigation-continues-efforts-to-halt-refund-fraud.
41

DOJ-Tax, Dir. No. 144, Tempormy Delegation of Authority to Authorize Grand Jwy Investigations, Criminal
Complaints, and Seizure Warrants for Certain Offenses Arising from Stolen Identity Refund Fraud, <j[!J[ 2, 4.

42

Examining the Skyrocketing Problem of Identity Theft Related Tax Fraud at the IRS: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Gov't Operations of the H Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 113th Cong. 17 (Aug. 2, 2013) (Written
Testimony of Daniel Welfel, Principal Deputy Commissioner, IRS).
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of disclosure issues will be addressed infra. One area where the IRS could improve is in the pursuit
of prisoners who seek refunds through identity theft. If it could leverage the resource of the parole
boards with respect to these crimes, it could gain enforcement muscle without having to expend
significant CI resources. 43
Over the past three fiscal years, CI has helped convict over 2,100 identity thieves. 44 In fiscal year
2016 alone, IRS Criminal Investigation enforcement efforts resulted in 613 prosecutions in which
the thief was sentenced for a crime related to identity theft. 45 Of course, the devotion of this much
CI resources to this problem comes at the expense of the prosecution of other tax crimes. Some
people see the use of CI resources to pursue identity theft as a use that is not completely consistent
with its mission; however, devoting this much effort to pursuing this crime can have a very positive
impact on stopping the activity. Because some of the identity theft occurs offshore, it can present
significant difficulties in reaching the perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
Return Integrity and Correspondence Services
Within the IRS, the Return Integrity and Correspondence Services ("RICS") function, which falls
under the Wage & Investment ("W&I") Division, seeks to identify and stop refund-related identity
theft before it occurs. 46 If this function works correctly, it protects both individual taxpayers and
the system as a whole. This function is critical to the overall integrity of the tax refund system.
Each year, tens of thousands of attempts are made to breach the IRS system and find weaknesses
to exploit that would result in significant refunds going to thieves. Within RICS, the Integrity and
Verification Operations ("IV0")47 function supports the Service's pre-refund fraud detection and
prevention efforts. 48 The IVO strives to protect revenue by identifying potentially fraudulent tax
returns, verifying the accuracy of reported income and withholding information, and stopping the
refund of returns that do not meet specified criteria. 49 If a tax return gets identified as meeting
identity theft criteria, it is then routed to the IVO function's Taxpayer Protection Program

43

See discussion in article cited in footnote 14, supra note 14.

44

IRS, STATISTICALDATA-lDENTITY THEFT INVESTIGATIONS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/statistical-data-identity-theftinvestigations (last updated Oct. 12, 2016).

45

!d.

46

IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Vol. 1, 46, available at
http://www. taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/20 15ARC/ARC 15 _ Volumel.pdf. See also TIGTA,
2016-40-006, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE THAT REFUNDS CLAIMED ON POTENTIALLY
FRAUDULENTTAXRETURNSARENOTERRONEOUSLYRELEASED 1 (Nov. 12, 2015).
47

IVO was formerly known as the Taxpayer Assurance Program under Accounts Management (AMTAP). In 2013,
the Service moved AMTAP out of the Accounts Management function to RICS and renamed it as well. I.R.M.
25.23.2.21.2(1) (Oct. 13, 2016).
48

TIGTA, 2016-40-006, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE THAT REFUNDS CLAIMED ON
POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS ARE NOT ERRONEOUSLY RELEASED 1 (Nov. 12, 20 15).

49

Id. at 2.

9

("TPP"). 50
:

This part of the effort against identity theft does not rely on reporting by an, individual victim but
identification in the system of returns that should not be processed. The IRS, is constantly seeking
to refine its filters to catch the bad returns at the outset. For example, it will no longer send 500
refunds to the same address as it did several years ago. If the same address is used for refunds on
more than a specified number of returns, the IRS filters will kick in and prevent the issuance of
the refunds until further investigation can occur.
Identity Theft Supporting Documentation
For persons who find themselves the subject of identity theft or who suspect that they might be the
subject of identity theft, the IRS has a process for them to use to alert the IRS. If the IRS did not
catch the identity theft with its filters, it will begin to take action toward the true taxpayer that
alerts the true taxpayer that something is amiss. The true taxpayer may first discover that her
personal information has been compromised upon receipt of a CP2000 notice for a prior filing
year. The notice will typically come as quite a surprise because it will contain income or other
information of which the true taxpayer has no knowledge. The true taxpayer will wonder why the
IRS has contacted them and sent incmTect information. By denying that she ever earned the
income or lived in the state in which that income was earned, the true taxpayer begins the process
of aie1ting the IRS. Because the IRS encounters some of the same claims in situations in which
there has not been identity theft, it must carefully listen to the taxpayer and will require the taxpayer
to provide documentation in support of their story. At this point, the true taxpayer in an identity
theft case will feel particularly put upon because they must, in effect, prove a negative.
Alternatively, a taxpayer may have her electronically filed return rejected by the Service, as an
identity thief has already filed a return using that taxpayer's TIN. Upon notification by the
taxpayer, the Service will flag the taxpayer's account with an identity theft indicatorY
If the Service employee cannot properly determine the ownership of the SSN used on the
potentially fraudulent return, then the employee may request that the taxpayer provide identity
theft supporting documentation to verify that the taxpayer is the true holder of the TIN. 52 A driver's
license, state I.D. card, passport, or Social Security card are acceptable as proof of identity. 53 In
addition to these documents, the IRS requires that the taxpayer file some evidence of identity theft:
either a police report or the IRS Form 14039 IRS Identity Theft Affidavit. 54 The Service requires
that the taxpayer provide this documentation once per incident. The taxpayer provides this
50

TIGTA, 2016-40-008, CONTINUED REFINEMENT OF THE RETURN REVIEW PROGRAM IDENTITY THEFT DETECTION
MODELS IS NEEDED TO INCREASE DETECTION 2 (Dec. 11, 2015).
51

The indicator is TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM. I.R.M. 25.23.2.16(1).

52

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(3).

53

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(1)(1).

54

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(1)(2).
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information only one time when there may be multiple years in question, but all of which are
investigated as a result of one incident. 55
The information provided by the true taxpayer is valid for three years after the date that the Service
receives the information from the taxpayer. 56 The IRS default position is that a once it has sent the
taxpayer a proposed adjustment, the true taxpayer's failure to submit the documentation requested
by the IRS indicates that the true taxpayer is not an identity theft victim. 57 While the position of
the IRS concerning response to its notices is logical and necessary, the taxpayer finds themselves
in a situation that demands immediate and significant attention. Not all taxpayers are equipped to
adequately assist the IRS (and themselves) in fixing the problem. This puts a burden on the system
and the taxpayer.
Assuming that the taxpayer can timely submit the requested documents completely and legibly,
the IRS will usually notify the taxpayer that it has classified the matter as one of identity theft and
that it is working toward resolution of the problem. It will also notify the taxpayer that resolution
may take six months. 58 Once the IRS has reached the initial conclusion that identity theft occurred,
it should update the taxpayer's account, if necessary, to accurately reflect the type of identity theft
suspected. 59 When the IRS employee handling the case verifies that the person who provided the
supporting documentation is a victim of identity theft and confirms that she is the owner of the
SSN at issue, the employee should update the address associated with the true taxpayer and make
sure that notices are not sent to the address of the perpetrator. 60
When the IRS determines that identity theft occurs and adjusts the true taxpayer's account to reflect
their correctly filed return or to remove income from the fraudulent return, it should notify the
taxpayer. It generally includes in that correspondence the name of an employee at IPSU to contact
if there are questions or continuing concerns. In a recent case at the Harvard clinic, I called this
number on behalf of a client in order to verify that the account had been properly adjusted. The
IPSU employee told me that she would not provide me with a copy of the client's account transcript
and that I would need to obtain that transcript through ordinary channels. I pointed out to her that
once the identity theft indicator is placed onto an account it cannot be obtained through e-Services
55

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(11).

56

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(10).

57

I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(3).

58

I.R.M. 25.23.2.10.

59
Currently, there are five different Tax Administration Source Codes that the Service may apply: INCOME,
MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, and OTHER.I.R.M. 25.23.2.17.3(3). The Service uses INCOME when income has been
reported under the taxpayer's SSN without his consent or knowledge. Id. It uses MULTFL when two or more returns
are filed for the same tax period under the same SSN. !d. If a combination of both income and improper returns are at
issue, then the Service uses the INCMUL code. !d. If the issue arises out of an account for a taxpayer who normally
does not have a filing requirement, then the Service codes the incident as NOFL. !d. Finally, if the matter does not fit
into any of the tax administration codes, then the Service uses the OTHER code. Id. These codes are useful to the
Service as they direct further investigation and research into the identity theft matter.
60

I.R.M. 25.23.2.8.
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or through calling the Practitioner Priodty Hotline. Nonetheless, the IPSU employee declined to
provide an account transcript showing the conection of the account. With a few months the client
received another notice from the IRS which made clear that the IRS had not cleared up the account.
In order to resolve the issue, it became necessary to involve the Local Taxpayer Advocate. This
is an example of the burden that identity theft places on the system and the taxpayer, as well as the
failure of some of the IRS procedures to fully address the problem of identity theft.
Identity Protection Personal Identification Number
In an effort to prevent any further harm to victims of identity theft, the IRS can issue an Identity

Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) after the case is fully resolved. 61 IP PINs
started as a pilot program in 2011. In 2014, the Service expanded the use of IP PINs to select
taxpayers, not all of whom were victims of identity theft. 62 The IP PIN is pdmarily used to prevent
electronic filing fraud, but may also be used on a paper return. IP PINs offer an additional level of
security for the taxpayer who has been or fears becoming a victim of identity theft. If the IRS
issues an IP PIN to a taxpayer, any tax return filed with the taxpayer's TIN without the IP PIN will
not post to the taxpayer's account. 63 For the taxpayers' safety, the IRS issues new IP PINs each
year in December for use in the coming filing season. In the event an IP PIN is lost or misplaced,
the taxpayer can request a new one from the IRS but must go through proper authentication
processes to ensure that the taxpayer is authorized to receive the IP PIN. 64 Because of rampant
identity theft fraud in cettain parts of the country, the program was expanded in recent years to
allow opt-in by taxpayers who reside in Georgia, Flodda, or the District of Columbia. 65 Prior to
the 2015 filing season, the Service sent notices to select groups of taxpayers identified as at dsk
for possible identity theft, informing them that they may elect to receive an IP PIN for their own
protection. 66 Due to the recent information breach at Equifax, advocates have requested that the
IRS consider making IP PINs available nationwide, but the IRS has rejected this proposal to date.
Obtaining Taxpayer Information to Resolve Identity Theft Cases

The disclosure laws generally protect a taxpayer's infotmation and prevent identity theft; however,
61

I.R.M. 25.23.2.20.

62

I.R.M. 25.23.2.20.2.

63

I.R.M. 25.23.2.20(6). An IP PIN must be entered for all TIN that have a IP PIN requirement, regardless of whether
the TIN belongs to the primary taxpayer, their spouse or their dependents, for electronically filed Form 1040 Individual
Income Tax series, Form 2441 Child and Dependent Care Expenses and Schedule Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
I.R.M. 25.23.2.20(3).
64

I.R.M. 25.23.2.20.1.

65

IP PIN Pilot Continues in Georgia, Florida and the District of Columbia, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/IdentityProtection-PIN-Pilot-Program (last updated Feb. 11, 2017). Taxpayers may access the Service's IP PIN opt-in tool
online. See Get An Identity Protection PIN (IP PIN), https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Get-An-Identity-Protection-PIN
(last updated Mar. 17, 20 17).
66

Understanding Your CP01F Notice, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Understanding-Your-CP01-Notice (last
updated Feb. 8, 2017).
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when a taxpayer is the known victim of identity theft the IRS procedures can make it very difficult
for the taxpayer to access their own information. In part, the issue stems from the IRS desire to
provide extra protection for an account in which a thief possesses the kind of information that
might, in ordinary circumstances, allow the thief access to the taxpayer's information at the IRS
by having the ability to answer identifying questions. In part, the issue stems from the IRS duty
to protect the fraudulent return of the thief which is not the return of the taxpayer. Threading the
needle to provide taxpayer's necessary information while preventing further identity theft provides
quite a challenge to the IRS.
In confirmed or suspected cases of identity theft, the IRS marks a taxpayer's account with various
types of identity theft indictors. 67 When these markers exist, the practitioner will generally find it
difficult to obtain any "return" or "return information" from the Service reported under a client's
SSN because IRS employees are trained to be more cognizant in these cases about the potential
for unauthorized disclosures of taxpayer information protected by section 6103. 68 One approach
that practitioners sometimes take when they have a client who they suspect is the victim of identity
theft is to obtain all of the information on their client's account before disclosing to the IRS that
the client is a victim of identity theft. Before the markers are on the account, the practitioner will
usually experience little difficulty in accessing the information through the normal channels.
On April 4, 2014, the IRS re-announced through its weekly e-News for tax professionals (April
4th Notice) that it would no longer process or release requests for taxpayer transcripts through
TDS when a taxpayer's account contained an identity theft indicator. 69 Presently, when a
taxpayer's authorized representative attempts to pull a transcript through the TDS system on behalf
of a victim (or Service suspected victim) of identity theft, the practitioner will receive a notice,
which states, "[w ]e apologize for the inconvenience but we are not able to process your request at
this time. Please have your client contact the Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU) at 800908-4490."70 The taxpayer then receives a paper copy in the mail of the same notice for every year
and transcript type the representative attempted to get off TDS. 71 The notice also instructs tax
professionals with a POA on file that they may contact IPSU to obtain client transcripts. 72
As discussed above, a large part of the reluctance regarding whether to release taxpayer
67

See I.R.M. 8.6.5.2(8); I.R.M. 25.23.2.15.

68

See, e.g., I.R.M. 21.2.3.5.8.

69

e-News for Tax Professionals, Issue Number: 2014-14.

70

Letter from Patricia LaPosta, Director, Electronic Products & Services Support, IRS, to Taxpayer (name redacted)
(Apr. 20, 2014) (on file with author, Rachael Rubenstein).

'

71

See e-News for Tax Professionals, Issue Number: 2014-14. See also IRS: ID Theft Victims Can't Receive Transcripts
Through Delivery System, DAILY TAX REP, (BNA), April4, 2014, at G-4.

72

In practice, phone assistors who answer the toll-free IPSU line, as well as the practitioner priority service (PPS)
line, seem unsure whether they are permitted to release various transcripts and other confidential information when
the account contains any type of identity theft indicator. It is not uncommon for these calls to end with the practitioner
unable to receive any requested information.
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infotmation associated with identity theft turns on the issue of whose "return" or "return
infmmation" is it: the taxpayer's or the return of the identity thief? 73 While the IRS appears to
recognize the need for identity theft victims and their representatives to have access to information
in the taxpayer's account in order to properly address the issue, the Office of Chief Counsel has
issued several, not always consistent, opinions concerning the legal interpretation of section 6103
disclosure issues related to identity theft. 74
Since first addressing the issue in a 2008 PMTA document, the Service's position has evolved to
better assist victims but would really benefit from a statutory fix. Presently, the Service takes the
position that once the invalid return is submitted, it becomes the return information of both the
true owner of the SSN and the identity thief because the information relates to the potential
investigation of liability with respect to both parties. 75 Under this analysis, a victim of identity
theft, and her designated representative, generally has a right to a copy of the bad tax return as
long as disclosure would not impair federal tax administration. 76 If a criminal investigation, for
example, is underway with respect to the fraudulent return, the true taxpayer could find themselves
in a waiting game to get the information because the IRS does not want to release the information
and possibly impair the investigation.
The authority for the most recent opunon of Chief Counsel's Office that allows greater
dissemination to the true taxpayer of the fraudulent return is found in section 6103(e)(7), which
allows for disclosure of return infmmation to persons authorized to have access to the return of a
taxpayer as long as disclosure would not "seriously impair federal tax administration.'m The new
rationale is that while the identity thiefs return submission contains "return infmmation," it is not
a valid "return" as contemplated by section 6103(b)(1) because it is "not ftled by the true taxpayer
or with the taxpayer's consent." 78 Because the true owner of the SSN did not sign the filed tax
return, the return lacks a valid signature, as required by the Beard test. 79 The bad return also cannot
73
See Disclosure Issues Related to Identity Theft, PMTA 2012-005, 3-4 (Jan. 18, 2012), available at
https://www.irs.gov/publlanoa/pmta_2012-05.pdf.
74

Id.; Identity Theft Returns and Disclosures Under Section 6103, PMTA 2009-024 (Jun. 8, 2008), available at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf; Systematically Identified BMF Identity Theft, PMTA 2015-019
(Aug. 7, 2015), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa!PMTA-2015-19.pdf.

75

PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3-4; PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at 6-7 (where the identity thief files a
fraudulent return in the name of an otherwise legitimate business, the return information created and gathered as part
of that fraudulent filing is the return information of the business victim; however, where the identity thief uses an
individual victim's identity infmmation to obtain an EIN and/or file fraudulent tax returns for a fictitious business
(other than a sole proprietorship), the information would not be the return information of the individual victim because
the individual does not have liability under the Code).
76

PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 5-6.

77
Id. at 5; I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7). The most recent Chief Counsel memorandum entitled "Identity Theft- Disclosure
Issues under I.R.C. 6103" is dated July 8, 2016 and was released on August 25, 2017. It is labeled DISSP-138861-15
and is copied in its entirety at the end of this outline.
78

PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3; PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at 4-5.

79

I d.; Under Beard v. Commissioner, the test to determine whether a document constitutes a valid return filing contains
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be considered a valid return under the Beard test because it does not represent "an honest and
reasonable attempt to comply with federal tax laws." 80 Even though the bad return is treated as a
nullity from the standpoint of its validity as a return, it does contain return information as defined
by section 6103(b)(2) because it includes "information received, acquired, or generated by the
Service in connection with the determination of a taxpayer's liability." 81 Some of the opinions
written about how or whether to allow the true taxpayer to see everything in their own account
seem maddeningly complex because the Chief Counsel lawyers are struggling to deal with a statute
that was not designed to address identity theft and because the consequences to an IRS employee
of wrongful disclosure are severe. No one wants to see the case in which an identity thief
successfully sues the IRS for a disclosure violation related to the turning over of information from
the fraudulent return.
In 2015, the IRS set out procedures allowing identity theft victims have access to important tax
account information, including copies of fraudulent tax returns. 82 Through these procedures,
identity theft victims can obtain a redacted copy of a fraudulent return that was filed and accepted
by the Service using the identity theft victim's name and TIN. In order to comply with federal
privacy laws, the Service requires that the victim's name and TIN be listed as either the primary
or the secondary taxpayer on the fraudulent return. 83 If, for example, the fraudulent return lists the
victim as a dependent, the Service will not release the fraudulent return information to her because
she would not meet the test under the privacy laws as the IRS currently interprets them. The IRS
will only do this if the case involves a Form 1040 Series tax return. Currently, it will not release
business tax returns under this process. 84
In order to request the return, the taxpayer or her representative must complete Form 4506-F,
Request for Copy of Fraudulent Return. 85 The form must be mailed to the following address:
IRS
Fresno, CA 93888-0025 86
four elements: "First, there must be sufficient data to calculate tax liability; second, the document must purport to be
a return; third, there must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and fourth,
the taxpayer must execute the return under penalties of perjury." Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777 (1984).
80

PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3 (citing Beard, 82 T.C. at 777).

81

Id. (citing Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at

6.
82

See TIGTA, 2017-40-011, ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE PROCESSES OF A NEWLY DEVELOPED PROGRAM
THAT ENABLES VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT TO REQUEST COPIES OF FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS 1 (Nov. 8, 2016);
see also Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Instructions-forRequesting-Copy-of-Fraudulent-Returns (last updated Feb. 17, 2017).
83

Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns, supra note 79.

84

Id.

85

!d. Prior to October 1, 2016, the IRS had asked taxpayers send a letter providing similar information to Form 4506F, however the lack of a standardized form led to processing errors. See TIGTA, 2017-40-011, supra note 79, at 6.
86

Returns being sent via private delivery service should instead be mailed to: IRS, 5045 East Butler Avenue, Fresno,
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Refund Suits
When the taxpayer has been the victim of refund related identity theft, the IRS is not making
adequate progress towards resolution and the return of the taxpayer seeks a refund, the taxpayer
can tum to the "normal" refund litigation process to seek an expedited review of the request for
refund. If six months have passed since the taxpayer filed the return seeking a refund which is
being held up while the IRS seeks to resolve the identity theft issue, the taxpayer can file suit.
Before embarking on this route, the practitioner should make sure the client does not have other
compliance issues with the Service or identity theft problems affecting other tax years, especially
years in which a refund suit is not an appropriate remedy. Further, the case must involve a tax year
(or years) where the victim has experienced true identity theft refund fraud, as opposed to a case
where the taxpayer victim had her tax refund(s) offset due to collection issues resulting from prior
year identity theft issues. If the taxpayer is low income, both courts offer petitioners the option of
filing suit without paying the normal filing fee. At least one low income taxpayer clinic has had
success in bringing refund suits as a method for forcing earlier resolution of refund identity theft
and getting the refund to the client.
Tax Court
Victims of identity theft can most easily end up in Tax Court because they will receive a notice of
deficiency based on their failure to report income earned by employment related identity theft or
the claim of a deduction or credit in the case of business related identity theft. The thief may have
used the taxpayer's address or the IRS has reviewed their records and found the victim's address.
In that case, the IRS will send a notice of deficiency to the victim.· If the IRS does not send a
notice of deficiency to the victim's last known address, the victim may whether challenge the
notice of deficiency is valid.
If the taxpayer receives the notice of deficiency either because it is sent to his or her last known

address or he or she somehow gets a copy, before filing with the Tax Court, the victim may
utilize Rev. Proc. 98-54 to ask the IRS to rescind the notice of deficiency and work to conect
the account. Once the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, however, the IRS will not
rescind the notice of deficiency. 87
Once a petition is filed, the taxpayer should work with IRS counsel to try to resolve the case. The
good news in a Tax Court case is that frequently taxpayers can use section 620l(d) to put the
burden of proof on the IRS with respect to the income reported on the Form W-2 or Form 1099.
This section came into the code in 1996 as a part of Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 legislation and
piggybacks on the 5th Circuit decision in Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (1991), holding
that a "naked" Fom1 1099 reporting income to a taxpayer was insufficient to cause the taxpayer to
have a deficiency. Section 620l(d) placed the burden of proof on the IRS if a taxpayer contests
the validity of an information return and cooperates with the IRS during the examination phase of
CA 93 727, "Identity Theft- Request for Fraudulent Return." Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns,
supra note 79.
87

See Chief Counsel Memorandum CC;PA:06-MEAvmtine April9, 2012.
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the case. The IRS must go out to the sender of the Form 1099 and verify the correctness of the
information. For someone who is the victim of identity theft, this will generally result in a
successful resolution of the case for the true taxpayer.
Representatives should carefully review any proposed stipulations of settled issue or decision
documents in settled Tax Court cases to see whether respondent may be trying to assert penalties
that were not in the original notice of deficiency. To assert such penalties, such as late file or late
pay, respondent is required to amend the answer to raise it and then has the burden of proof.
If the victim did not file an original tax return and can now do so representative should consider
whether spouses should or can join in a newly filed original return. 88 If the IRS allows a joint
return to be filed, it will summarily assess the spouse who is not the victim.

Other issues can present themselves in Tax Court when a taxpayer is the victim of identity theft.
Practitioners should be alert to clients raising issues of concern about information in their case and
use informal or formal discovery of the IRS to gain access to information in the IRS files that
might shed light on the issue.
Practical Tips

Certain issues come up with enough frequency that there are some actions a practitioner with a
client facing an identity theft issue can use to make the process smoother. The discussion here
does not follow a specific order but rather offers random pieces of advice that might not occur in
the order discussed here.
1) If you suspect identity theft, get a POA, contact the IRS and obtain all of the taxpayer's
transcripts (wage and income, tax return and account transcripts) for as many periods as
you think will be needed in order to resolve the issue before you file the identity theft form
with the IRS. Once you make it known to the IRS that your client is or may be a victim of
identity theft and the indicators go onto their account, your ability to obtain the transcripts,
which may be critical to piecing together what has happened may be significantly limited.
2) Let your client know that fixing an identity theft case can take a long time. It is important
· to provide the client with a picture of the length of the process in order to avoid significant
frustration.
3) If your client has filed a tax return seeking a refund and more than six months has passed
with no action from the IRS on the refund and no action in sight, consider bringing a suit
for refund as a means of moving the case. 89
4) Check the client's credit reports to determine if the identity theft is limited to a tax problem.
88

Camara v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. No. 13 (September 28, 2017)

89

Rob Nassau, "Using a Refund suit to remedy identity theft ofreturn preparer fraud," March 16, 2017,
procedurallytaxing.com, http://procedurallytaxing.com/using-a-refund-suit-to-remedy-identity-theft-of-retumpreparer-fraud/.
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Put a fraud indicator on the credit repmi to prevent further use by the thief of the taxpayer's
identity.
5) Obtain an IP PIN number for filing with future tax returns. 90 The IRS readily provides
these numbers to individuals in certain states but not others. It will provide the IP PIN for
someone who it recognizes as a victim of tax identity fraud. 91
6) Go to your Local Taxpayer Advocate's office if you are having problems getting the IRS
to assist you. Identity theft has been the biggest inventory issue for the Taxpayer Advocate
Service for almost the past decade. The recent decline in cases has also resulted in a
relatively dramatic decline in these cases in the TAS offices but because of their past
experience these offices have a lot of expertise and are generally more accessible than the
IPSU units which are remote and not as customer friendly.
7) Expect the unexpected. One victim of identity theft had a fraudulent refund return filed on
his behalf which resulted in the refund being offset as part of the federal offset program
and the refund paid his outstanding student loan debt. Then as the IRS began to unwind
that transaction more problems ensued for the taxpayer, the IRS, and probably the
Department of Education. 92
8) Be aware that the additional income that could appear because of employment theft can
have an impact on a client's benefits and be proactive about fmding the possible points of
impact before the taxpayer loses benefits.
9) Be alert to the possibility of identity theft when the client comes in complaining of IRS
correspondence or collection action they cannot understand. Because many clients put
their head in the sand regarding the IRS, it can be easy to become jaded about clients
complaining about IRS correspondence. Sometimes these complaints have a legitimate
basis due to the IRS pursuing the true taxpayer based on information in the system
generated by a thief. An example can be an elder taxpayer who no longer has a filing
requirement who suddenly finds the IRS seeking to collect based on income earned by a
thief, followed by exam notices going to the thief's address and then the Collection division
of the IRS locating the true taxpayer and demanding payment.
10) Obtain multiple original copies of identity documents (perhaps 5-8), so the practitioner
does not have to make copies of copied identity documents when later submitting multiple
Identity Theft Affidavits (ITAs) to various Service functions. If the identity documents
submitted along with the ITA are illegible the affidavit may not be accepted and, instead,

https ://www .irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity -protection-pin. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) had previously made available Identify Theft PINs for consumers in Florida, Georgia, and the

90

District of Columbia, and consumers in those states should consider getting the pin (which they should do before
getting a freeze).
91

See Letter dated September 21, 2017 to Commissioner Koskinen from advocates seeking to expand the
availability of IP Pins after the Equifax data breach, https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/irs-lttr-re-efxbreach.pdf.
92

Ivy v. IRS, 197 F.Supp.3d 139 (D.D.C. 2016). An appeal was filed on August 24, 2016 to the D.C. Circuit.
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returned.
11) Obtain proof of identity theft from the taxpayer. At a minimum, the practitioner will need
documents sufficient to satisfy the Service's substantiation requirements, a copy of a police
report or a completed ITA, and a copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued
form of identification. 93 If the taxpayer possesses multiple types of identity documents, it's
preferable to obtain copies of whatever the taxpayer can produce. Examples of acceptable
identity documents include: passport, driver's license, and Social Security Card. A birth
certificate may be helpful as a secondary form of identification, but it cannot be the only
document used to establish identity.
12) Soon after the detailed interview with the taxpayer, the practitioner should memorialize a
specific yet concise version of the client's story in the narrative section of the ITA. The
ITA should be completed with the taxpayer. Finally, several (perhaps 5-8) original copies
of the ITA should be printed, reviewed, and signed. There is a good chance the practitioner
may need to use this form to prove the client's identity to several Service functions where
the identity theft has negatively impacted the client's tax accounts for various tax years.
13) If the true taxpayer has not already visited a police station to report the identity theft, the
practitioner should exercise caution when recommending that the client make an in person
police report due to the potential for outstanding arrest warrants as a result of the actions
by the thief. At a minimum, the client should be advised about a possible arrest when
visiting a police station if a warrant exists under her identity.
14) Consider checking the taxpayer's earnings history from the SSA both to obtain an
independent source of the taxpayer's earnings and to check with SSA to make sure that
nothing the thiefhas done will adversely impact the taxpayer's SSA account.

Conclusion
The IRS has come a long way over the past decade to improve its system of dealing with victims
of identity theft. The numbers of cases have declined significantly but still remain large in absolute
terms. Clients will feel especially put upon in paying for representation in these cases because
they are the victim. They will want quick resolution of a problem that will not usually go away
quickly. Understanding the IRS systems for approaching identity theft, familiarizing yourself with
the disclosure issues presented, and quickly pursuing the available avenues for resolution will keep
your client from suffering more than necessary, but nothing will prevent them from significant
pain once someone has stolen their identity and used it in a way that implicates the IRS.

93
I.R.M. 25.23.2.17. Under the I.R.M., only one copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of
identification must be sent along with the IRS ITA. Id.
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Identity Theft- Disclosure Issues under I.R.C. § 6103
Several offices have requested assistance in determining which disclosures are
appropriate in the identity theft context. This memorandum consolidates previous
legal advice 94 with regard to disclosure issues under section 6103 in cases
involving identity theft.
Although this memorandum provides a broad overview of identity theft disclosure
issues in the context of identity theft, it does not purport to discuss or provide
formal legal guidance with respect to all potential identity theft factual scenarios
that could exist. The discussion below represents scenarios that have previously
been provided and analyzed, but identity theft scenarios are constantly evolving.
The legal analysis involved in identity theft disclosure issues can vary significantly
based on any number of factual details, such as where the victim's information
appears on a particular filing and the context in which a return was filed with the
Service. Thus it is recommended that all novel identity theft disclosure issues be
referred to P&A for legal review and advice.
The advice in this memorandum only applies to certain situations in which
identity theft is an issue. Applying this advice in non-identity theft contexts
94

"Systematically Identified BMF Identity Theft," August 7, 2015, PMTA-2015-19, available at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/PMTA-2015-19.pdf; "Disclosure Issues Related to Identity
Theft," Jan. 18, 2012, PMTA 2012-05, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta 201205.pdf (issued by Cl based on P&A's research and analysis); "Identity Theft Returns and
Disclosures Under Section 61 03," June 8, 2008, PMTA 2009-024, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf.
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could result in an unauthorized disclosure and possible civil and criminal
penalties under I.R.C. §§ 7431 and 7213.
ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Is a return filed by an identity thief protected under section 61 03?

•
•

Some identity theft "returns" are not returns for 6103 purposes.
Identity theft "returns" are "return information" protected under section
6103.

2. Whose return information is it?

•
•

•
•

A fraudulent refund return is the return information of both the victim
and the thief from the moment it is filed with the Service.
If a victim is listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, the return is
not the return information of the victim.
For returns filed by an employer, the return information is generally the
employer's, the employee's, and the victim's.
A return filed using a fraudulent EIN, which was obtained using a
stolen SSN, is not the return information of the victim.

3. Who may receive the disclosure?

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

The Service may disclose a taxpayer's return information to the
taxpayer, but an identity thief is not necessarily a taxpayer.
A taxpayer may consent to the disclosure of his or her own return
information.
The Service is not authorized to disclose the identity thief's separate
and distinct return information to an identity theft victim.
The Service is authorized to disclose return information to other
employees of the Department of the Treasury.
The Service is authorized to disclose return information in a Federal or
State judicial or administrative tax proceeding.
Legal guardians of minor victims may obtain copies of the minor
victim's return information.
In some circumstances, the Service may disclose return information,
but not "taxpayer return information," to other Federal agencies.
The Service may only disclose return information to state and local
officials if they are considered Federal employees for section 6103
purposes.
The Service may disclose information to confirm a return's legitimacy.

4. To what extent may impairment of tax administration be considered in making
a disclosure determination?
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•

•

Information from an identity theft return should not be disclosed if that
information would seriously impair Federal tax administration.
Victims may obtain copies of fraudulent returns .
DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES

I.

BACKGROUND

In recent years identity theft and other refund fraud schemes have proliferated
across the country. In response, the Department of Justice created an Identity
Theft Task Force ("ITTF"), which is comprised of Federal agencies including the
Service, the Postal Service, the Secret Service, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, as well as state and local law enforcement.
Identity theft can take many forms, but there are some common scenarios that
typically confront the Service. The first is refund fraud, in which the perpetrator
who has stolen an identity files a tax "return" early in the filing season using a
Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, in the name or with the taxpayer
identification number ("TIN"),~. Social Security Number ("SSN") or Employer
Identification Number ("EIN"), of the victim, who has not yet filed a return for the
tax year. For example, the perpetrator will often attach to the Form 1040 one or
more false Forms W-2 showing bogus wages and withholding credits that exceed
the wages, thereby providing the basis for the purported refund. The Form will
also instruct that the refund be directly deposited into a bank account under the
perpetrator's control. When the identity theft victim later files a legitimate return
for the tax year, the Service will likely flag it because of the significant
discrepancies with the prior filed return and, pending resolution, freeze any refund
claimed on the second return. Eventually, through investigation, the identity theft
and the fraud will become apparent. A variation of this scenario involves filing
return forms in the name of a business to claim a fraudulent refund. In other
situations, an identity thief uses another taxpayer's information to claim that
taxpayer as a dependent in order to create additional deductions.
In another common scenario, an undocumented worker, who does not have the
legal status to work in the United States, uses the victim's stolen SSN to appear
workeligible. The undocumented worker provides the SSN to the worker's
employer, and the employer in turn files a Form W-2 reporting the worker's wages
and tax withholding under the SSN provided. The undocumented worker then
files a return, along with Form W-2, that, between the two forms, reflect the
identity theft victim's SSN and name along with the actual wages and tax withheld
of the undocumented worker. In processing the return, the Service may attribute
the wages to the identity theft victim and determine additional tax due. Another
variation on this scenario would involve the undocumented worker utilizing the
victim's SSN on the Form W-2, but would vary in that the return would contain the
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number ("ITIN"), along with the actual wages
and tax withheld, of the undocumented worker, and the only information of the
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victim would be the SSN on the Form W-2 submitted with the return. In this
variation, there are no tax consequences to the victim as the wages are not
attributed to the victim, but, nonetheless, the victim's account is marked with an
indicator of employment-related identity theft.
When the Service confronts identity theft and refund fraud, complex disclosure
questions often arise. The determination of whether to release certain
information depends on numerous factors, including what kind of return
information is involved, whose return information it is, and who would receive the
information in a disclosure.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. DISCLOSURES GENERALLY

Section 61 03(a) provides that "returns" and "return information" are confidential
and shall not be disclosed except as authorized in section 6103 or elsewhere in
Title 26. Section 6103(b)(1) defines "return" to mean any tax or information ·
return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided
for that is filed with the Secretary, on behalf of, or with respect to any person, and
any amendment and supplement thereto, including supporting schedules and
attachments to the return. The term "return information" is broad and includes
any information "received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected
by" the Service with regard to a taxpayer's liability under the Code. See I.R.C. §
6103(b)(2)(A); McQueen v. United States, 264 F.Supp.2d 502, 516 (S.D. Tex.
2003), aff'd, 100 F. App'x 964 (5th Cir. 2004); LaRouche
v. Dep't of Treasury, 112 F.Supp.2d 48, 54 (D.O. D. 2000); Hull v. IRS, 656 F.3d
1174, 1195-96 (1Oth Cir. 2011 ).
There is a subset of return information known as "taxpayer return information"
that is subject to additional restrictions. Taxpayer return information is "return
information ... which is filed with, or furnished to," the Service "by or on behalf of
the taxpayer to whom such return information relates." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3). In
other words, taxpayer return information is return information provided by the
taxpayer himself. Taxpayer return information enjoys special protections and is
particularly relevant when determining whether information may be disclosed to
other Federal agencies for nontax crimes, as discussed later in this
memorandum.
Taxpayers generally may access their own return information under section
6103(e). See Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984). For example,
an individual has a right to view his or her own return under section
61 03(e)(1 )(A)(i), and section 61 03(e)(1 )(C) generally 95 allows any member of a
partnership during the period covered by the return to receive disclosure of the

95

I.R.C. § 6103(e)(10) imposes significant limitations.
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return information of that partnership. 96 The Service must withhold return
information if disclosing such information would "seriously impair Federal tax
administration." I.R.C. § 61 03(e)(7).
Although taxpayers generally may access their own return information,
access to the return information of others is strictly limited. The Service may
disclose the return or return information for a particular taxpayer to anyone whom
the taxpayer may
designate. I.R.C. § 61 03(c). In other words, a taxpayer may consent to the
release of that taxpayer's own return information to a third party.
The Service may disclose certain information under section 61 03(k)(6) when the
Service is attempting to gather information that is otherwise not reasonably
available in connection with a tax investigation. Treas. Reg. § 301.61 03(k)(6)1(a)(1) allows a Service employee to disclose return information to the extent the
disclosure is necessary to obtain information related to official duties. Additional
exceptions may also allow for disclosure,~. disclosure to state tax officials,
state and local law enforcement agencies, and disclosure to certain Federal
officers and employees for purposes of tax administration. I.R.C. § 61 03(d) and

(h).
To determine to whom an item of return information "belongs," a critical issue is
the identity of the person or entity with respect to whose liability the information
was generated or received by the Service. Martin v. IRS, 857 F.2d 722, 724
(1Oth Cir. 1988). The determining factor is whether the information relates to the
Service's investigation or determination of another taxpayer's liability . .!Q.,_at 724.
In certain circumstances, material can constitute the return information of more
than one taxpayer. Solargistic Corp. v. United States, 921 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir.
1991 ). If a taxpayer requests access to a record with return information of more
than one taxpayer, the Service must not release any return information that does
not "belong" to that taxpayer unless an exception to section 6103 protection
applies.
In the context of identity theft, various factors must be considered before
determining whether returns and return information may be disclosed.
B. IS A RETURN FILED BY AN IDENTITY THIEF PROTECTED
UNDER SECTION 61 03?
To determine whether something filed with the Service by an identity thief is
protected from disclosure, the Service must first determine if the record is
covered under section 6103. Since most documents filed with the Service by
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Additional information about disclosure to persons having material interest in the return

information of different types of taxpayers may be found at section 61 03(e).
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identity thieves are on return forms, the Service must determine if the document
filed by an identity thief is a return under section 6103.

1.

Some identity theft "returns" are not returns for 6103 purposes.

If a Form 1040 or other return form is not a valid return, the document itself does
not qualify for disclosure protections under section 6103. See "Identity Theft
Returns and Disclosures Under Section 6103," June 8, 2008, PMTA 2009-024,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf; Zellerbach Paper
Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934). An invalid return is not "required by,
or provided for or permitted under" the Code, as described in section 6103(b)(1),
so if a document is not a valid return, it may not be afforded disclosure protection
under section 6103.
Requirements for a valid return include that the return be filed as part of an
honest and reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws and that the return be
signed by the purported taxpayer under the penalties of perjury. See Beard v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777(1984) (listing the requirements for a filing to be a
valid tax return). A return form that is filed by an identity thief using a victim's
name and TIN and attempts to intercept the victim's refund is generally not a valid
return and therefore is not afforded protection under section 61 03(b)(1 ).
The method through which the identity thief obtains stolen information likely will
not make a difference in whether the document is a valid return. For example, if
an identity thief steals the EIN of a company to file a fraudulent return and take
the company's refund, the return is invalid. If, instead, the identity thief steals an
SSN and then applies for an EIN under that stolen name, the return form filed
using that fake EIN is still invalid because it was not filed as part of an honest and
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws and is not signed by the person in
whose name the purported return is filed. The form of the fraud, at least in this
case, does not matter for the determination of whether the return is valid. 97
Note that this rule does not apply in the case of an undocumented worker who
uses a stolen SSN, but otherwise reports actual wages. This would be a valid
return because, under the circumstances, it represents a reasonable effort to
comply with the tax laws.
To illustrate this rule, there is a legal difference between a Form 1040 filed by an
identity thief and a Form W-2 filed by an employer using a stolen SSN. The
employer is filing the W-2 in order to comply with employment tax responsibilities,
and although there are penalties for filing information returns with missing or
incorrect information under section 6721, this Form W-2 is not a sham return like
a fictitious refund return. The form reflects a real employment relationship with
associated wage payments and tax withholding and is filed as a good-faith
97

The form of the fraud does matter for determining whose return information the return is, as

discussed below.
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information return. Unlike a Form 1040 from an identity thief reporting a phony
set of facts, the Form W-2 in this scenario is not a fiction, and though potentially
subject to a penalty, the Form W-2 would still constitute a valid return. As a result
it is a return as defined in section 6103 as well.

2. Identity theft "returns" are "return information" protected under section 6103.
Although the return of an identity thief seeking a fraudulent refund is a nullity, the
return may be legally protected "return information" under the broad definition of
return information in section 61 03(b)(2)(A). The document is return information
because it is "received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by"
the Service as part of a determination of liability, or potential liability under the
Code. I.R.C. § 61 03(b)(2)(A).
Assuming there is some potential liability to be determined under the Code, the
document does qualify as return information, and it can only be disclosed as
authorized by the Code. I.R.C. § 61 03(a). By knowingly filing a false return, the
identity thief subjects himself to possible other liabilities (~, under section
7207), and any information furnished to and received by the Service with respect
to the "determination of the existence, or possible existence of liability of [the
identity thief] for an offense under the Code" is return information. See, ~'
O'Connor v. IRS, 698 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd without op., 935
F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1991) (a threat against a Service employee is a violation of
section 7212 and information collected with respect to that offense is return
information). Thus, any information collected by the Service with regard to the
identity thief's potential liability would be the return information of the identity thief.

C. WHOSE RETURN INFORMATION IS IT?
In the enactment of, and subsequent amendments to section 6103, Congress did
not expressly provide for the situation in which one individual files a fraudulent
return using the name or TIN of another taxpayer. As noted above, in
determining to whom a particular item of return information belongs, the Service
considers the identity of the person or entity with respect to whose liability the
information was generated or received by the Service. Martin, supra at 724.
In certain circumstances, a particular item may be return information of more than
one taxpayer. Solargistic, supra. Return information related to identity theft is
often the return information of both the victim and the thief. To determine whether
section 6103 allows for disclosure of returns or return information, the Service
must determine the "owner'' of the return or return information.

1 . A fraudulent refund return is the return information of the victim and the
thief from the moment it is filed with the Service.
When a fraudulent refund return is first filed with the Service, the Service will
assume it is the return information of the victim, since the victim's identifying
information is on the return. Information such as the date the return was filed, the
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document locator number assigned to it, the liability and payment amounts
reported on the return, and the steps taken to process the return (including any
refund) will all be posted to the victim's account for that taxable year. All this
information was collected by the Service with respect to the possible tax liability of
the victim, making that information the victim's return information. Section 6103
does not incorporate any temporal limit on the designation or identification of
returns and return information of being that of a particular taxpayer, so the return
would remain the return information of the victim. 98
At the same time, as discussed above, the identity thief, by knowingly filing a
false return, subjects himself to other possible liabilities, so the return is the thief's
return information as well. See, g&_, O'Connor, supra. As a result, the return
filed in an identity theft scenario is often the return information of both the victim
and the thief. Even though the Service may not be aware that the return or return
information belongs to the thief until the identity theft is discovered, it is still the
return information of the identity thief from the moment it is filed with the Service.

2. If a victim is listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, the return is not
the return information of the victim.

In one variation of the identity theft scenarios, the identity thief claims the victim
as a dependent for fraudulent refund purposes. Being claimed as a dependent
could affect the determination of the victim's liability, specifically with regard to
what deductions the victim could take (e.g., I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) (limiting the standard
deduction for dependents); I.R.C. § 151 (b) (limiting the personal exemption for
dependents). The document, however, would not be the return information of the
victim listed as a dependent on the fraudulent return because being listed as a
dependent on a tax return does not, in and of itself, subject the dependent to any
liability under the Code.
It should be noted, however, that the Service could examine a victim's return
because the Service noticed that the victim was taking certain deductions. If the
Service is determining the allowance or denial of deductions based on the
conflicting information contained in the return filed by the identity thief, it is
possible that the identity thief's return information could become germane to the
determination of the victim's liability. In that case, the portion of the return that
would be relevant to the victim's liability could be disclosed under section
61 03(h)(4), which allows disclosures related to judicial or tax administration
proceedings. The Service should redact any information that the victim is not
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Even if the Service were to confirm the "bad return" as fraudulent before it is processed and
take no action with respect to the victim's account, the submission of a purported return
bearing the victim's name and/or SSN, and the unsuccessful attempt to affect the victim's tax
account by means of a "bad return" in
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entitled to or that might seriously harm tax administration, as discussed below,
before disclosing that information to the victim. 6

3. For returns filed by an employer, the return information is generally the
employer's, the employee's, and the victim's.
The type of return may also be relevant to determining the "owner" of the return
information. For example, when an employer files a Form W-2 with the Service,
the information contained in that return is return information both of the employer
and the employee. As a result, in the case of an undocumented worker using
someone else's SSN, the return information belongs to the
employee/undocumented worker, to the employer, and to the victim, based on the
analysis above.
the victim's name or TIN would nevertheless constitute the victim's return
information just as if it were processed.
6 See the discussion below, under "Other Considerations," for information on how
a victim can request a copy of a fraudulent return even if he or she is not involved
in a judicial or tax administration proceeding.

4. A return filed using a fraudulent EIN, which was obtained using a stolen
SSN, is not the return information of the victim.
If an identity thief steals an EIN and files a fraudulent return for a business, that
return is the return information of both the identity thief and the business victim.
If, however, the identity thief steals an SSN, applies for an EIN using that SSN,
and then files a fraudulent return for the EIN, then the return is not the return
information of the individual victim because the fraudulent return is not related to
the liability of the individual. Simply being listed on the application for an EIN
does not in and of itself create a tax liability. As a result, that information may
only be disclosed to the victim if otherwise authorized under Title 26.
D. WHO MAY RECEIVE THE DISCLOSURE?
The Service must determine to whom any return information would be disclosed
before releasing that information because the exceptions to section 6103 are
often based on who is receiving the disclosure. For example, the Service may
disclose to a taxpayer his or her own returns or return information, but the Service
is limited in who else may receive disclosures.

1 . The Service may disclose a taxpayer's return information to the taxpayer,
but an identity thief is not necessarily a taxpayer.
Section 61 03(e)(1 )(A)(i) and (7) authorize the Service to release returns and
return information of any taxpayer to the taxpayer himself. As a result, if
information related to an identity theft return is the victim's return information, the
Service may disclose that information to the victim. Additionally, an
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undocumented worker's return or return information may be disclosed to the
worker.
There is an argument, however, that a refund fraud identity thief must
demonstrate that he is a taxpayer before the Service can disclose return
information to him as the taxpayer under section 61 03(e)(7). Section 7701 (a)(14)
defines the term "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax."
An identity thief generally has not filed the fraudulent return because he is subject
to some internal revenue tax. Unless the identity thief can demonstrate that he is
subject to an internal revenue tax, the identity thief is not entitled to his return
information. 99

2. A taxpayer can consent to the disclosure of his own return information.
Although a taxpayer may generally have access to his own return information,
access to another taxpayer's return information is limited. Section 6103(c) allows
for a taxpayer to consent to the disclosure of returns or return information. A
victim of identity theft may wish to have a copy of a fraudulent return sent to state
or local authorities or another designee, and if the victim consents to the release
of his return information, the Service may disclose that information to the victim's
designee. 100 Once again, the refund fraud identity thief must demonstrate that he
is a taxpayer before he may take advantage of section 6103(c).

3. The Setvice is not authorized to disclose the identity thief's separate and
distinct return information to an identity thief victim.
The Code provides no authority for disclosure of an identity thief's separate and
distinct return information to an identity theft victim. The victim is not even entitled
to disclosure of the identity thief's identity. Cf. Hodge v. IRS, 2003 WL 22327940
(D.D.C. 2003) (the name and address of a person who used plaintiff's social
security number on her tax return was third party return information that could not
be disclosed to the plaintiff). However, where the information is the return
information of both the victim and the thief, the Service may legally disclose the
information to the victim. The Service, however, may conclude as a matter of
policy that disclosure of return information of the thief to the victim will impair tax
administration and accordingly refuse to make such disclosures. See I.R.C. §
61 03(e)(7).
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Most identity thieves would not request return information, and the specific facts in any such

scenario will be relevant in determining whether to release the return information to the
identity thief.
100

See the discussion below, under "Impairment and Policy Considerations," for information

on how a victim can request a copy of a fraudulent return.
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It should be noted, however, that the SeNice now allows victims to obtain
redacted versions of identity thieves' returns. The method for obtaining such a
return is discussed below.

4. The Service is authorized to disclose return information to other
employees of the Department of the Treasury.
Since more than one SeNice operating division may be working on either the
victim's or the identity thief's case, employees may need to share return
information in the performance of tax administration duties. See I.R.C. §
61 03(h)(1 ). Internal sharing of documents does not, however, mean that the
shared information becomes return information of another taxpayer. If
information from one case is copied and placed in other case files, it should
clearly be labeled as third-party return information.

5. The Service is authorized to disclose return information in a Federal or
State judicial or administrative tax proceeding.
Section 6103(h)(4) allows the disclosure of a taxpayer's return information to a
third party if the disclosure meets one of four tests. 101 For example, in the case of
a victim who was claimed as a dependent on a fraudulent refund return, the
victim's own liability may be at issue in an examination. Section 6103(h)(4) would
authorize disclosing the relevant portion of the fraudulent refund return in order to
resolve the examination of the victim's liability. The fraudulent refund return is not
the victim's return information, but the SeNice can disclose it to the victim.

6. Legal guardians of minor victims may obtain copies of the minor victim's
return information.
Section 61 03(e)(2) provides that if an individual is legally incompetent, the
individual's return or return information may be disclosed to the "committee,
trustee, or guardian of his estate." In this regard, a minor is legally incompetent
and this provision allows parents to access the return or return information of a
minor if, under state law, the parent is the legal guardian of the minor's estate.
See IRM 11.3.2.4.1 0; IRS Publication 4639, Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference
Guide at 2-14 (rev. 10-2012). As a result, the parent may only request the
minor's return information if that parent is the legal guardian under state law.
Once it is clear that a parent may request the return information of the minor, the
SeNice must then analyze what portions, if any, of the identity theft return would
be considered the return information of the minor. For example, if the minor were
listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, that information would not generally
101

Section 61 03(h)(4) authorizes disclosure of returns and return information in a tax
proceeding (1) if either the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding or the proceeding arose out
of or in connection with determining the taxpayer's liability or collection of taxes owed by the
taxpayer under the Code; (2) if the
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be the minor's return information. If, however, the minor were listed as the
primary or secondary taxpayer on the return, then that return would be the return
information of the minor because it was collected by the Service as part of a
determination of the minor child's liability under the Code. It might also be the
return information of the parent since, under section 6201 (c), an unpaid
assessment against a minor is also considered to be an unpaid assessment
against the parent, to the extent the assessment is based on compensation for
the minor's services.

7. In some circumstances, the Service may disclose return information, but
not "taxpayer return information," to other Federal agencies.
There are offenses related to identity theft that are not related to tax
administration. Section 61 03(h) does not provide the ability to disclose return
information to other Federal agencies for nontax crimes.
Section 61 03(i)(3)(A), however, does provide limited authority for the Service to
make proactive disclosures of return information, other than taxpayer return
information,
treatment of an item on the third party's return is directly related to the resolution
of an issue in the tax proceeding; (3) if the third party's return or return
information directly relates to a transactional relationship between the third party
and the taxpayer whose liability is at issue and the third party's return or return
information directly affects the resolution of an issue in the tax proceeding; and
(4) if certain requirements are met in certain criminal proceedings. For additional
information regarding disclosures under section 6103(h)(4), please see the
Disclosure and Privacy Law Reference Guide, infra.
that may constitute evidence of the commission of a Federal nontax crinie "to the
extent necessary to apprise the head of the appropriate Federal agency charged
with the responsibility of enforcing such law." I.R.C. § 61 03(i)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis
added). Because the statutory text uses the word "apprise," the scope of return
information disclosed under section 61 03(i)(3)(A) should be limited so as to only
alert the Federal nontax criminal law enforcement agency about the possible
existence of a nontax crime.
Such disclosures are authorized regardless of whether the Service has
concurrent jurisdiction over the crime. While the statute does not require that the
return information be conclusive, the return information should sufficiently identify
the specific criminal act to which it relates.
The Service may not, however, disclose "taxpayer return information" to other
Federal agencies for nontax crimes. Taxpayer return information is return
information that is "filed with, or furnished to, the Secretary by or on behalf of the
taxpayer to whom such return information relates." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3). A Form
W-2 is entirely taxpayer return information. The employer files it for his own
liabilities, so it is his taxpayer return information. The employer files it on behalf
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of the employee for the employee's liability, even if that employee is an
undocumented worker. The employer also files it on behalf of the victim, and it
will likely have an effect on the victim's liability. As a result, a Form W-2 (or
similar document) is almost always taxpayer return information.
Note, however, that if the Federal nontax criminal law enforcement agency
decides to investigate the matter, it can seek the disclosure of returns and any
additional return information (including any taxpayer return information) pursuant
to sections 6103(i)(1) and (2).102

8. The Service may only disclose return information to state and local
officials if they are considered Federal employees for section 6103
purposes.
Generally speaking, there is no authority under the Code to disclose information
to state and local law enforcement for nontax administration purposes. Cf.
I.R.C. § 61 03(d). State and local law enforcement personnel, however, may be
considered Federal employees for the purposes of section 6103 so long as they
are formally appointed as Federal employees (rather than merely detailed), they
are assisting in a Federal investigation, and are supervised by a Federal
employee.
It should be remembered that a taxpayer may always consent to the disclosure of
his or her own return information under section 61 03(c). In the case of a victim of
identity theft, the taxpayer could consent to the disclosure of his or her own tax
return information to state and local law enforcement. The Service, however,
would need to ensure that such a disclosure would not seriously impair Federal
tax administration, as discussed below. Additionally, a copy of any consent
should be retained for at least a three-year period.

9. The Service may disclose information to confirm a return's legitimacy.
The Service may disclose enough information necessary to determine whether a
return is legitimate under section 61 03(k)(6). The Service must reasonably
believe that the information is not otherwise available or doing so must be
necessary to carry out the employee's official duties. Treas. Reg. §
301.61 03(k)(6)-1 (a)(2). In the identity theft context, when an employer files a
document, such as a W-2, that includes a stolen SSN, the Service may contact
the employer to inform the employer that the SSN does not match. The Service
102

Federal agencies may obtain tax information for use in nontax criminal investigations
pursuant to an ex parte order of a federal district court judge or magistrate. I.R.C. §
61 03(i)(1 ). Information obtained from a source other than the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
representative may be disclosed in response to a written request from the head of a federal
agency or its Inspector General or by certain designated Department of Justice employees.
I.R.C. § 61 03(i)(2). For additional information regarding disclosures under section 61 03(i),
please see the Disclosure and Privacy Law Reference Guide, supra.
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must be cautious, however, in what exactly is revealed to the employer. The
Service may inform the employer that the name and SSN do not match, but the
Service may not inform the employer of the identity of the true owner of the SSN.
Additionally, if the Service determines a mismatch between the name and other
contact information on a return and the SSN on, for example, a Form W-2, then
the Service may contact the employee to investigate the discrepancy. The
Service should take care, however, not to disclose information related to the
victim, including the victim's identity, to the employee.
E. IMPAIRMENT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Before disclosing any additional information, the Service should also consider the
following issues.

1 . Information from an identity theft return should not be disclosed if that
information would seriously impair Federal tax administration.
The Service must withhold information that would seriously impair tax
administration, even if it would otherwise be eligible for disclosure under section
6103, including certain third-party return information. See I.R.C. § 61 03(c), (e)(7).
Once a potential identity theft has occurred, the Service should consider whether
to withhold information, either through redaction or other means, regarding thirdparty identity theft victims and other third parties if disclosing that information
would seriously impair Federal tax administration. It is a business decision what
information might need to be withheld based on the damage that might be done
to tax administration if such information were disclosed. In determining whether
to redact certain third-party information, the Service should consider Hodge, in
which the court found that the name and address of a person who used plaintiff's
SSN was third-party return information that could not be disclosed to the plaintiff.
Hodge, supra.

2. Victims may obtain copies of fraudulent returns.
The Service has determined that a victim of identity theft may request a copy of a
return that was filed using his or her own information, though it may be heavily
redacted. Redactions will include many of the issues discussed in this
memorandum. For example, in some cases, a fraudulent return may list multiple
victims' information, and the Service should redact the other victims' return
information before disclosing any of the victim's return information. For additional
information, the victim should visit https://www.irs.gov/lndividuals/lnstructions-forRequesting-Copy-of-Fraudulent-Returns.
Please call Joy Gerdy Zogby at (202)317-4927 if you have any further questions.
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